As one of the promising information-centric networking (ICN) architectures, NDN has attracted tremendous research attention and effort in the past decade. In particular, security and privacy remain significant concerns and challenges due to the fact that most of the traditional cryptographic primitives are no longer suitable for NDN architecture. For example, the traditional cryptographic primitives aim to secure point-to-point communications, always requiring explicit descriptions of to where or whom the data packets are intended, while network addressing or locating in NDN becomes implicit. To deal with such issues, the recently developed cryptographic primitives such as ABE have been applied to NDN. Also, to efficiently solve the trust-roots problem and seamlessly deploy cryptographic infrastructures, the concept of SDN has been introduced to NDN as well. This tutorial is devoted to exploring the interesting integration between NDN, ABE, and SDN.
IntroductIon
While the Internet has become an indispensable part of our daily lives, its access modes and functionalities experience dramatic change due to the rapid development of Internet applications and services. The legacy TCP/IP architecture has been increasingly recognized to suffer from some fundamental flaws in routing expandability, mobility, as well as security and privacy protection. Therefore, future Internet architectures (FIAs) [1] have been proposed and gained widespread recognition in the past decade, among which two representative new networking paradigms are information-centric networking (ICN) [2] and software-defined networking (SDN) [3] . Specifically, instead of using traditional network addressing techniques (e.g., IP address, NAT, DNS), ICN is focused on content-based routing by implementing the transformation from the idea of "WHERE to find the required contents" to the idea of "WHAT kind of contents are to be found." Among the various ICN techniques, content-centric networking (CCN) [4] and named data networking (NDN) [5] have gained wider popularity, and CCN/NDN testbeds have already covered more than 30 cities across America and Asia. SDN, as another paradigm of FIA, provides convenience for not only developing new network applications, but also unified and rapid deployment of various newly developed FIAs, thanks to the separation of control plane and data plane. At present, OpenFlow-based SDN has won support from both academia and industry, and the related international standards and worldwide testbeds are gradually being set up [6] .
Despite their advantages, all kinds of ICN architectures face new challenges in security/privacy aspects [7, 8] . In particular, both the NDN and SDN communities pay far less attention to the security and privacy issues than they deserve. For example, although the name-based routing technique in NDN naturally provides a robust way to mitigate distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks targeting IP networks, novel attacks that particularly exploit the features of NDN have been identified, for example, interest flooding attack (IFA). The same story occurs in SDN, in which an SDN controller compromised by a malicious network app may lead to the failure of the whole network, while the SDN switches can also be poisoned to launch DDoS attacks to the controller. It is worth noting, however, that the straightforward application of traditional security mechanisms to those novel networking paradigms are not effective, primarily because the new networking architectures do not explicitly specify how to deploy security or privacy mechanisms. For instance, it remains unclear how to design effective cryptographic protocols in NDN architecture, considering the fact that most of those protocols heavily depend on network addresses or locations, which are not available in NDN.
This tutorial is intended to propose a framework that bridges NDN architecture with newly developed cryptographic primitives such as attribute-based encryption (ABE), and specifically discusses the feasibility of coupling NDN and SDN to solve the trust-roots problem by seamlessly deploying cryptographic infrastructures.
securIty In ndn
The original concept of ICN was proposed in 1999 [2] , and was defined as a new networking paradigm in which users are concerned with the contents or data instead of their locations or network addresses. Among various innovative practices of ICN, the alliance of CCN and NDN manifests a promising prospect, and the two terms are sometimes interchangeable. Securing Named Data Networking: Attribute-Based Encryption and Beyond
Technically speaking, NDN is a clean-slate design that does not rely on TCP/IP architecture. As shown in Fig. 1 , the performance bottleneck (i.e., the so-called "this-waist" part) in NDN is due to NDN chunks instead of IP packets. This means that instead of treating host-based addresses as the first-class network objects, NDN regards data as the first-class network objects that are associated with globally unique names, finally leading to a name-based routing mechanism. Thus, the notion of "host" is no longer explicitly specified in NDN, while Interest and Data are the only two types of packets in NDN. To implement a name-based routing algorithm, each NDN router maintains three major data structures:
• Pending interest table (PIT), which contains currently unsatisfied Interests and corresponding incoming interfaces • Forwarding interest base (FIB), which contains name prefixes and corresponding outgoing interfaces • Content storage (CS) for data caching and retrieval Then the communications in NDN use the pull model: a consumer requests content of interest by sending an interest packet; If an entity (a router or a host) can find a matched content object (i.e., named data packet) in its CS, the corresponding data packet will be returned to the requester by simply following the reverse path of the Interest request. Naturally, such receiver-driven and data-centric communication protocols are immune from DDoS attacks targeting traditional TCP/IP architecture. In particular, IP spoofing becomes impossible. Also, in NDN, it is usually the closest cache nodes that respond to the requests. As a result, a DDoS attacker cannot simply overwhelm a victim node by repeatedly sending Interest requests. Moreover, NDN provides certain built-in security mechanisms for data protection. For example, all the data traveling in the network are digitally signed by the data producers, ensuring data authenticity and integrity.
Despite the aforementioned built-in mechanisms, a set of security challenges still remains in NDN, some of which are highlighted in the following.
•First, in TCP/IP networks, the deployment of traditional cryptography primitives rely on the trust roots, for example, certificate authority (CA) and public key infrastructures (PKIs), which are hard to deploy, however, due to the lack of explicit network addressing in NDN.
•Second, due to the name-based routing mechanism and lack of explicit network addresses in NDN, content protection and access control become extremely challenging. In particular, as the data producers do not know the potential requesters, they cannot encrypt the data in advance without the knowledge of the receiver. In fact, the data producers are not even involved in the routing, and the data has already been cached in some NDN nodes that are close to the Interest requesting nodes.
•Last but not least, NDN suffers fromIFAs and content poisonous attacks (CPAs) [9] . Specifically, an IFA aims to exhaust the PIT resources of related routing NDN nodes by exploiting the feature of name-based routing. An IFA becomes even worse when malicious data are published with an eye-catching or fancy name along with an invalid verification key. This will attract requests of potential consumers, which lead to numerous repeated requests since the return packet fails to pass the signature verification. Also, as the signature verification in NDN routing nodes is optional, the hijacked cache node might inject malicious data in the middle routing nodes; eventually the poisoned data will be cached in all the nodes along the request-response routing path.
securIty In sdn
In 2008, with a primary objective of simplifying the switch design of Ethane, OpenFlow was proposed and quickly gained popularity in both industry and academia. The following years have witnessed the rapid development of SDN. In 2014, the open source SDN operation system ONOS and the open network functions virtualization (NFV) platform program OPNFV were announced. Generally, SDN architecture consists of three planes [6] : application plane, which runs different network applications; control plane, which manages network intelligence and decision making; and data plane, which contains the physical forwarding devices. The communications between the three planes are enabled by northbound application provider interfaces (APIs) (app-control plane) and southbound protocols (control-data plane), for example, OpenFlow. In addition, the configuration and communication compatibility and interoperability between different data and control plane devices can be enabled by open and standard west-east interfaces and protocols.
To date, nontrivial research efforts have been made to identify security threats in SDN. As shown in Fig. 2 , seven critical threat vectors have been identified [6] . For example, the first threat vector refers to the DDoS attacks potentially caused by forged traffic flows. An attacker can exploit particular vulnerabilities of the forwarding devices (attack vector 2), as well as the logically centralized controllers (vector 4). The communications between data plane and control plane via OpenFlow can also be potentially compromised (vector 3). Vector 5 refers to the fact that the controller can be compromised by the malicious network apps. The administrative station hosting the controller is vulnerable to attacker 6), and vector 7 represents the lack of trust resources for fast fault diagnosis and secure recovery. While vectors 1, 2, 6, and 7 are commonly seen in traditional networks, vectors 3, 4 and 5 essentially result from the separation between control and data planes, as well as the SDN controller.
In [10] , Grusho et al. pointed out that SDN security could be enhanced in at least two ways. One is to securely couple SDN with other new FIAs for gaining complementary advantages, and the other is to, via cryptographic means, prevent malicious entities from accessing critical information. However, to the best of our knowledge, few specific solutions have been seen. We are therefore motivated to propose our solutions to put these two suggestions together in the next section.
leVerAgIng Abe And sdn to secure ndn ABE is an interesting extension of identity-based encryption (IBE). Different from certificates of users in traditional PKI, which are produced and maintained via a CA, certifi cates in IBE are implicitly bound with the relationship between the users' identities and their associated secrets, which are produced by a trust third party called the private key generator (PKG). Compared to CA, PKG has a much smaller workload in the sense that PKG need not maintain users' certifi cates after sending the corresponding secret keys to users via secure channels. From 1984 to 2001, when Boneh and Franklin proposed the fi rst practical IBE scheme, people took a 17-year-long journey in probing this problem. After then, IBE manifests a quick development. To support using IBE in a hierarchical organization (say an international company), IBE was extended to hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE). To support living things features (e.g., irises) being used as users' identities, fuzzy-identity-based encryption (FIBE) was proposed in 2005, and this concept was quickly extended to ABE in 2006 to support more fl exible and fine-grained access control. With ABE, the potential user who has the right to access some confidential contents is no longer a single user, but rather a set of users that are determined by an access structure, which is usually defi ned as a logical composition of users' attributes such as name, gender, age, lifestyle, and even social attributes including affi liations, titles, and so on [11] .
The basic diagram of ABE can be illustrated in Fig. 3 . After the PKG publishes the system parameters, a data producer (say a document creator, John or Tim) can encrypt the document with an access structure (say the logic tree marked with grey background), and any NDN user (say Alice) with attributes that satisfy the access structure can decrypt the document by using the corresponding secret key SK att . That is, the data producer does not need to know who will read the document in advance. Instead, he/she only needs to encrypt data based on the knowledge about what kinds of user groups can access the data. This feature makes ABE particularly useful in NDN, where a data producer/sender does not need to know who are the potential data consumer/receivers. More specifically, we illustrate four desirable properties of ABE that can be leveraged in NDN.
Identities: In NDN, each data has a unique name, which can naturally be used as the identity of the data.
Hierarchical Identity: In NDN, the prefi x-based naming method caters to the framework of HIBE, which provides tailor-made support for hierarchical routing.
Fuzzy-Identity: By nature, FIBE can support wildcard characters in name-based routing.
Attributes: ABE enables the NDN data producers, via logical composition of attributes, to determine a fine-grained specification on what kinds of users can learn the encrypted data during the process of encrypting, without worrying about the real identities of the potential receivers.
We therefore conclude that the cryptographic primitives IBE, HIBE, FIBE, and ABE have significant potential to achieve data encryption in NDN. More specifi cally, the deployment of these cryptographic primitives in NDN are given in the following.
First, we need to address the problem of transferring access rights. Whether IBE, HIBE, FIBE, or ABE primitives are used, the potential decrypting groups are specifi ed via certain logical composition of their attributes, and this kind of specifi cation becomes fixed once it is embedded in the corresponding ciphertexts. However, the traditional access control in general is a dynamic and time-variant system: say some users have promoted their accessibility levels, or the confidentiality policies toward some encrypted data have changed due to some unexpected events such as large scope leakages of information of user decryption keys. Thus, we indeed need a mechanism to, without a decrypting-then-encrypting process, transform encrypted data for an old access structure/group to encrypted data for a new access structure/group. To solve this problem, ABE has to combine another cryptographic primitive, proxy re-encryption (PRE), leading to so-called attribute-based proxy re-encryption (AB-PRE). Again, let us take Fig. 3 as an exam- Figure 2 . SDN architecture and attack vectors [6] . D a t a p l a n e D a t a p l a n e C o n t r o l p l a n e C o n t r o l p l a n e ple, where AB-PRE enables a semi-trust proxy, and without seeing the plaintexts, transforms the encrypted data for Alice to other encrypted data for Bob. After this, Bob can see the corresponding plaintexts by using his own decryption key [11] . Here, Alice and Bob could be representatives of identities, attributes, or even access structures. Second, privacy-preserving routing and interests-data matching are even more complex than encrypting and decrypting in NDN. Say, in NDN, we might want to look up some sensitive contents, but we do not like to expose our interests to NDN caching nodes. This is a paradox since NDN caching nodes need the capability to perform matching between the requested interests and cached data. Fortunately, ABE has already coupled successfully with recently developed cryptographic primitives such as keyword searchable encryption (KSE) and equality testable encryption (ETE) [12] . KSE enables us to match encrypted keywords without decrypting, while ETE enables us to test whether two random ciphertexts contain the same plaintext without decrypting. It is clear that KSE and ETE are very useful in namebased routing and attribute-based routing in NDN (Fig. 4) , where an interest-packet consists of two parts: encrypted interests and encrypted requester-attributes. The first part will be confidentially matched with encrypted data-names, while the second part will be confidentially matched with encrypted data-attributes.
Third, deploying trust-roots (say PKG) and security policies in NDN faces new challenges. In NDN architecture, the security layer and strategy layer are separated by the "thin-waist" layer ( Fig. 1) . This kind of decoupling mechanism is reasonable since in the strategy layer, security policies are specified by the composition of security primitives (encryption, signature, authentication, etc.) and are aimed mainly at what we should do, without much concern about how to do it, while in the security layer, concrete security components (say cryptographic algorithms) are adopted according to security levels required by upper layer applications and are aimed at solving the problem of how to do it. To tackle the challenges due to the lack of explicit identities with respect to "host" and "network address," as mentioned above, SDN is introduced to NDN for achieving rapid and consistent deployment. More specifically, we follow the framework of [13] , but with the following improvements, to bridge NDN with OpenFlow in deploying trust-roots for supporting ABE and other aforementioned cryptographic primitives (Fig. 5) .
At first, the name-based routing system (NRS) is extended to the attribute-based routing system (ARS) (Fig. 4) . This extension is naturally enlightened by the idea of attribute-based cryptography, which is one of the most flexible and expressive access control technologies available today. The feasibility of this extension was shown by Ion et al. [14] , who already implemented ARS by using CCNx. However, our extension introduces the following remarkable improvements in the sense that the Broker in Ion et al.'s framework is removed, while an "AND/OR"-switchable logic node on top of the attribute-based access control (ABAC) tree is newly introduced. More specifically, the interest forwarding routing and the interest-data matching process are still inherited from the idea of NRS, but the backward data packet routing process is changed in a fully compatible manner: For the intermediate NDN routing interfaces, the "OR" logic is used, while for the last hop interfaces (i.e., reaching the target users), the last data forwarding condition is automatically switched to "AND" logic. The intuition behind this modifi cation is that for the target users, only if his/her attributes satisfy the access policy embedded in the encrypted data does he/she have the ability to read the data; while for intermediate NDN routing interfaces, it is reasonable to relax the "AND" logic to the "OR" logic for keeping a trace of requested data for potential subsequent similar -either similar in names or similar in attributes -requests. After that, OpenFlow is extended by adding cryptographic primitives, and a new control plane is built thereon. The extended OpenFlow controller can be viewed as nodes of ARS, and the new control plane consists of ARS and security infrastructures including CA, PKG, and so on. As for the data plane, Salsano's architecture can be followed. That is, the data plane consists of a series of CCN/NDN nodes and clients. The extended OpenFlow acts as the communication interface between control plane and data plane. For the strategy layer, the extended OpenFlow supports primitive calling specified by security policies, while for the upper security layer, the extended OpenFlow provides mapping between the primitives and the concrete security techniques such as running-time library of cryptographic algorithms.
Finally, the trust-roots and authentication chains are established based on certificate objects. Bian et al. [15] proposed a deployment hierarchy for key management in the UCLA NDN testbed, where the key-certifi cated pair of the testbed is taken as the trust-root, while key-certifi cate pairs of other sites, users, and devices are authenticated transitively via the chains of key-certifi cate pairs contained in NDN data packets. Moreover, by introducing the IBE/ABE into NDN, the certificate objects can even be simplified, say with the names or attributes alone acting as the public keys. By doing so, most of the communication
It is worth noting that employing ABE to NDN cannot solve all the security and privacy issues in NDN. To make our proposed framework useful, one of the assumptions is to securely implement and effi ciently deploy ABE and the related cryptographic components. Otherwise, new attacks or scalability issues can potentially be introduced. Today, most implementations of ABE are based on pairing. During the past decade, we have witnessed the rapid progress of fast and lightweight computations on pairings, and the core algorithms of ABE can be implemented in milliseconds. The practices reported in [13, 14] also indicate the feasibility of combining NDN with ABE and SDN.
Beyond securing NDN with ABE, we proceed to address the IFA attacks mentioned earlier. On one hand, proper use of cryptography can mitigate the scope and eff ectiveness of IFA attacks. For instance, the cryptographic primitive of attribute-based signature (ABS) can be used to enforce users sending interest requests, and we can deliberately choose those ABS schemes in the NDN security policy such that the workload of the verifi cation process is much lighter than the workload of the signing process. To further block IFA attacks, the signatures in interest requests are even enforced to involve some freshness, containing, for example, timestamps or fresh random salts, or solving online puzzles. On the other hand, we have envisioned a lightweight payment prototype for mitigating IFA attacks in NDN by charging virtual money for interest querying. In our study, three pricing functions -linear, asymptotical, and exponential -were simulated, 1 and we found that the simpler the better: Linear pricing strategy is good enough for ensuring a high ratio of the number of satisfi ed interests to the total number of interest requests (Fig. 6) . In brief, the whole NDN network in this prototype is viewed as an analogy of economic society: each user can request and obtain interesting data via paying some virtual money, and the charge automatically contains the cost for content producing, searching/matching, forwarding, and warehousing. As a result, an IFA attacker will be blocked when its virtual money is used up. Meanwhile, each NDN router can earn virtual money carried in the original interest request packet in providing services of interest/contents delivery and caching. In a very abstract perspective, we think the only diff erence between this analogical NDN society and the real economic society lies in the fact that a digital product in NDN society can be copied almost infinite times with little copying cost, while in real economic society, making two copies of the same kind of product means at least double the material cost. Therefore, an NDN router, by caching popular contents and providing them to a huge number of downstream requests, might quickly become a virtual nabobism, even richer than the content producers. This mechanism has the potential to motivate reasonable NDN nodes to C o n t r o l p l a n e C o n t r o l p l a n e request and deliver contents honestly and collaboratively, resulting in a healthy networking "ecological" environment.
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conclusIon
Although in the NDN architecture data communications are assumed to be encrypted, the lack of explicit identities with respect to "host" and "network address" make it extremely hard, if not impossible, to apply traditional PKI-based cryptographic primitives in NDN. Thus, this tutorial is intended to propose a framework of using the newly developed identity/attribute-based encryption in NDN, by associating identities and attributes with the proper ingredients of NDN. To further enhance the privacy-preserving capability of NDN, the ARS mechanism is proposed. Finally, SDN architecture is coupled with NDN for deploying trust-roots (e.g., PKG). Beyond securing NDN with ABE, a lightweight prototype of a virtual payment mechanism is also suggested to mitigate interest flooding attacks. 
